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Interpretation of Rule 42 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure - A Further Restriction
on the Use of Summary Proceedings.
I. PROPER PROCEDURE FOR PUNISHING CONTEMPTS-SUMMARY
PROCEEDING OR A HEARING?
Courts are universally acknowledged as being vested with the
power to punish for contempt,' but there has been disagreement
concerning the procedure that should be followed. Must there be a
hearing with notice, submission of arguments, and perhaps a jury, or
can the judge convict the defendant of contempt by the use of a
"summary proceeding"-a procedure which dispenses with the for-
mality and delay of a conventional court trial (e.g., issuance of pro-
cess, service of complaint and answer, holding of hearings, taking
evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, and submission of
findings).' It is the use of this summary proceeding, with its lack
of notice and a hearing, that has prompted criticism.'
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Judiciary Act of 17894 provided that courts of the United
States "shall have power ... to punish by fine or imprisonment, at
the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause
or hearing before the same." The statute placed no restrictions upon
the use of the contempt power, and several instances' of abuse
occurred. A succession of grievances against the arbitrary exercise
of the judicial power culminated in impeachment proceedings'
against Federal District Judge James H. Peck.! In 1826, Judge Peck
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the en-
forcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts, and consequently
to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United
States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any sub-
ject, they became possessed of this power.
Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873). See also Anderson v. Dunn, 5 U.S. 61, 67
(1821). For a complete list of cases to the same effect, see Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289,
303-04 (1888).
aSacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1951). See also: Annot., 96 L. Ed. 762 (1951)
and Annot., 3 L. Ed. 2d 1855 (1958).
'See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 194 (1957).
4 1 Stat. 73, 83.
sNelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COL. L. REV. 401,
422-23 (1928).
'For a complete record of the impeachment proceedings, see STANSBURY, REPORT OF
THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833).
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"'Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010, 1024
(1923). See also Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1940).
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had rendered an opinion which was fatal to the claim of a client of
Luke Lawless, an attorney. A few days later Lawless published in a
newspaper a detailed criticism of Peck's opinion. Peck found the
attorney guilty of contempt, sentenced him to one day in jail, and
suspended him from practice for eighteen months. Lawless petitioned
Congress for Peck's impeachment. The House of Representatives
brought impeachment proceedings against Peck, but the Senate
acquitted him by one vote. The House, fearing that the acquittal
might be construed as favoring Peck's use of the summary power,s
instructed its Judiciary Committee "to inquire into the expediency
of defining, by statute, all offenses which may be punished as con-
tempts of the courts of the United States, and also to limit the pun-
ishment for the same."' Nine days later a bill was introduced which
became the Act of March 2, 1831.10
The Act of 1831 seemingly restricted the use of summary pro-
ceedings to (1) cases of misbehavior in the presence of the courts,
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; (2)
misbehavior by court officers in their official transactions; and (3)
disobedience to orders or writs of the courts. 1 For many years the
decisions of the Supreme Court recognized that the act imposed
these limitations on the court's power to punish summarily for con-
tempt.12 However, in the 1918 case of Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States,'" the Supreme Court adopted an entirely differest in-
terpretation of the 1831 statute. A district judge had summarily
convicted for contempt a newspaper that had published, during a
' Nelles & King, supra note 5, at 430.
97 CoNG. DEB., 21st Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 1, 1831, Cols. 560-61.
15Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487.
"The Act of March 2, 1831, provided:
That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue attach-
ments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall not be
construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person or
persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of the
said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistence of
any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness ,or any other person or
persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the
said courts.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that if any person or persons shall, cor-
ruptly, or by threats or force, endeavour to influence, intimidate, or impede
any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the dis-
charge of his duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct, or
impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice
therein, every person or persons, so offending, shall be liable to prosecution
therefor, by indictment, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished, by fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding three
months, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offense.
"Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 511 (1873); Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 276
(1888); Ex parte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 285 (1888).
'a247 U.S. 402 (1917).
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trial, statements concerning the judge's integrity and fairness. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and stated that "there can
be no doubt that the [Act of 1831] . . . conferred no power not
already granted and imposed no limitations not already existing.'"
The effect of the Toledo decision was to remove "in the presence"
of the court as a limitation on the use of the summary power. Pos-
sible abuse of the summary proceeding again seemed imminent.
However, seven years later, in Cooke v. United States"1 the Supreme
Court changed its position and returned to the interpretation of the
act that had prevailed prior to Toledo. In Cooke, an attorney, after
receiving an adverse judgment in the first of several bankruptcy suits
against his client, wrote the court a critical letter, accusing the judge
of being personally prejudiced against the client and asking him to
refrain from hearing the remaining suits. The judge summarily con-
victed the attorney for contempt. In reversing the conviction, the
Supreme Court declared that summary punishment can only be used
when the contempt occurs in "open court."'" When it occurs else-
where, due process of law requires that the accused be advised of the
charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of
defense or explanation."
The holding in the Cooke case that a contempt can only be pun-
ished summarily when committed in open court was eventually
enacted into Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1946."8 Section (a) of that rule restates, in effect, the Cooke rule as
to summary disposition, providing that: "A criminal contempt
may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or
heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was com-
mitted in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered
of record."' 9
It can be seen that two requirements must be met before summary
punishment can be issued under rule 42 (a). First, the contempt must
be committed in the "actual presence" of the court, and second, the
14Id. at 418.
15267 U.S. 517 (1924). It is interesting to note that Cooke failed to overrule the
Toledo holding. In fact, Toledo was not expressly overruled until 1940 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1940).
"Id. at 534.
1
7  d. at 537.
"I The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including rule 42, became effective on
March 21, 1946. 327 U.S. 821 (1945).
" The Advisory Committee on the rules stated that rule 42(a) "is substantially a re-
statement of existing law, Ex pcrte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); Cooke v. United States,
267 U.S. 517 (1924)." Notes of Advisory Comm. on Rules, Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a). (Em-
phasis added.)
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judge must see or hear the conduct constituting the contempt. If
both requirements are met, the party committing the contempt can
be convicted immediately without being provided the safeguards of
notice and a hearing. Summary punishment for such contempts does
not deprive the defendant of due process because the judge saw the
offense and no amount of explanation could disprove the fact that
the contempt was committed. The policy reason behind allowing
summary punishment in such situations is the necessity of preserv-
ing order in the court room for the proper conduct of business."
The court must be able to act instantly to suppress disturbance or
violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the judge which
occurs in open court."
Rule 42 (b), on the other hand, requires that all contempts not
committed in the presence of the court or observed by the judge
shall be prosecuted only upon notice and after a hearing." In such
an instance the judge does not have personal knowledge of all the
facts constituting the contempt, and he must be informed of them
by the testimony of others." Due process, therefore, requires that
the defendant be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel
and prepare a defense.'M
III. SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS UNDER BROWN V. UNITED STATES
The enactment of rule 42 was looked upon as the final victory in
the battle against the abusive use of the summary proceeding. The
two requirements of section (a) appeared sufficient to prevent the
arbitrary exercise of the summary contempt power. In 1959, how-
ever, the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Brown v. United
States"2 cast doubt upon the application of the rule. A grand jury
2Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1924).
21 Id.
22 Rule 42(b) deals with disposition upon notice and hearing:
A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall
be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing,
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state
the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe
it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the
presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or
of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show
cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in
any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission
to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect
to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the
trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding
of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
5 2Annot., 96 L. Ed. 762, 765 (1951).
24 Id.
25359 U.S. 41 (1959). See also Note, 13 VAND. L. REv. 400 (1959).
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investigating possible violations of the Interstate Commerce Act"
subpoenaed Brown to testify. He appeared but refused to answer the
questions upon the ground of possible self-incrimination. He was
taken before a district judge, who told him that he was immune from
prosecution and ordered him to return to the grand jury room and to
answer the questions. Brown returned to the grand jury but refused
to answer the questions. He was again taken before the district court.
This time the judge himself repeated the questions to Brown, and
when he refused to answer, he was summarily convicted of contempt
under rule 42 (a) and sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment.
Brown contended that rule 42 (b) should have been applied; that by
depriving him of the safeguards in that rule, he was denied due pro-
cess of law. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, stating that
the contempt occurred in the "presence" of the court as required by
rule 42 (a). The Court reasoned that since a grand jury is merely an
appendage of a court and lacks the power to compel a witness to
testify, Brown was not guilty of contempt when he first refused to
answer the grand jury's questions. When Brown returned to the
grand jury room and again refused to answer the questions, in direct
disobedience of the court's order, he was for the first time guilty of
contempt. Since the disobedience of the court's order did not take
place in the actual presence of the court, a contempt proceeding
would have been proper at this stage only under rule 42(b). But
when Brown refused to answer the questions as propounded by the
judge, the Supreme Court concluded that the contempt was then in
the court's presence and that it was clearly proper to proceed under
rule 42 (a)."
In a strong dissent Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan, urged that rule 42 (a) was not in-
tended to apply in this situation. The Chief Justice stated that in
view of the concern long demonstrated by both Congress and the
Court over the possible abuse of the summary contempt power, it is
obvious that rule 42 (a) is reserved for exceptional circumstances.
The Brown decision was reaffirmed one year later in Levine v.
United States."' The court interpreted the procedure authorized by
Brown as consisting of three steps.2 First, it is proper for the district
"49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1964).
27359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959).
2
'1d. at 0.2 9 Id. at 51.
0 Id. at 54.
21 362 U.S. 610 (1959). See also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950); United





court to disregard any contempt committed outside its presence.
Second, the judge can then ask the questions directly to the witness
in the court's presence. Finally, the refusal of the witness to answer
can be punished summarily by the judge under rule 42 (a) as a con-
tempt committed in the actual presence of the court.
IV. HARRIS V. UNITED STATES
Six years after Brown was decided, an identical fact situation re-
appeared before the court in the case of Harris v. United States."5
Apparently, as a result of a change in the composition of the Court,"4
Brown was expressly overruled and the use of summary power au-
thorized by rule 42 (a) was restricted. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the majority, interpreted rule 42 (a) as being reserved for excep-
tional circumstances, such as acts threatening the judge or disrupting
a hearing or obstructing court proceedings. 5 The situation in Harris
was not one falling within the ambit of rule 42 (a) because the re-
fusal of Harris to answer was not an open, serious threat to orderly
procedure requiring instant and summary punishment." Moreover,
Mr. Justice Douglas expressly stated that section (a) of the rule can
only be used when the contempt occurs in the "actual presence of
the court."" In Harris, no contempt was even committed in the pres-
ence of the court. The real contempt, if any, occurred before the
grand jury-the refusal to answer to it when ordered by the court."8
The court concluded that the Harris situation falls properly
within the scope of rule 42 (b). Mr. Justice Douglas stated that
"Rule 42 (b) prescribes the 'procedural' regularity for all contempts
in the federal regime except those unusual situations envisioned by
3 382 U.S. 162 (1965). Like Brown, Harris was a witness before a grand jury and he
refused, on the ground of self-incrimination, to answer certain questions asked him. He was
taken before the district judge, who granted Harris immunity from prosecution and
ordered him to return to the grand jury room and answer the questions. Harris returned to
the grand jury but refused to answer any questions. He was taken again before the district
judge who repeated the questions and directed him to answer. When Harris refused, he was
adjudged guilty of criminal contempt under rule 42(a) and was sentenced to one year's
imprisonment.
34 Brown was decided on March 9, 1959. The majority consisted of Justices Stewart,
Clark, Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Doug-
las, and Brennan dissented. Subsequently, Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, both of the
majority, retired. They were replaced by Justices Fortas and White.
Harris was decided on December 6, 1965. Justice White joined with the three remaining
Justices who had constituted the majority in Brown, but Justice Fortas joined the four
Brown dissenters. Thus, the dissenters in Brown, with the addition of Justice Fortas, became
the majority in Harris. A change in the Court's composition apparently resulted in the over-
ruling of the summary contempt procedure of Brown.
-1 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965).
'aId. at 165.
7 Id. at 164.
as Id. at 164.
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Rule 42 (a) where instant action is necessary to protect the judicial
institution itself." 9
V. CONCLUSION
The Harris decision is in line with the historical attempt to curb
the use of the summary power. It would seem that the two restric-
tions of rule 42 (a) -that the contempt must occur in the actual
presence of the court and be observed by the judge-would be suffi-
cient to prevent abuse of the summary power. However, the Supreme
Court in Brown, under the guise of a constructive "presence of the
court," attempted to extend the summary power to grand jury in-
vestigations. Harris stops this attempted extension by adding, in effect,
a third limitation-the summary power cannot be used unless the
contempt is of a type that disrupts the orderly court procedure,
making instant action necessary.
The Harris decision abolished a fiction which might have caused
rule 42 (b) to become a dead letter. In Brown the contempt was
interpreted as occurring in the presence of the judge when the wit-
ness refused to answer the judge's repetition of the grand jury's
questions. As pointed out in Harris, the actual contempt was before
the grand jury. A subsequent repetition of the questions by the judge
added nothing since the contempt had already been completed in
the grand jury room.
The holding in Harris is also consistent with the wording of the
rule. Rule 42 (b) prescribes that criminal contempts, except as pro-
vided in subdivision (a), "shall" be prosecuted on notice. On the
other hand, rule 42 (a) provides that contempts committed in the
actual presence of the court "may" be punished summarily. Thus,
the wording of the rule demonstrates that the general mode of pro-
cedure was intended to be that prescribed by rule 42 (b), whereas
rule 42 (a) was to be restricted in its usage.
After the Harris decision, summary power is only available to a
judge when the contempt is observed by the judge, occurs in the
actual presence of the court, and disrupts the orderly court proce-
dure so that instant action is necessary. In all other situations the
witness is entitled to the protection and benefits of rule 42 (b) such
as notice, a hearing, bail, and possibly a jury trial.41
Joseph J. McCain, Jr.
aI d. at 167.
°Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 53 (1958) (Chief Justice Warren dissenting in
separate opinion).
41 See note 22 supra.
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